

2ND ATCHD COMBAT CO, G-S-HQ, LMS, FBBU, USAFIP

NAME OF UNIT

MACAUYAG DIMUPINGAN

UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER

1. Complaints
2. Investigating Officer's Notes
3. Rosters
4. NFC Letter Dated 2 Apr 47 W/TLR By Capt Robert L Morton



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS:

G-3 Form No. 2

HEADQUARTERS  
PHILIPPINE-RYUKYU COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3  
OFFICE RETAINED RECORD

SEQUENCE NO.  
1837

RADIO CITE

G-3 File No. GSCP U 094 PI

Date:

1 Apr 47

SUBJECT: Recognition, Request for  
FROM : Mr. Macauyag Dimupingan

Type of Communication  
Ltr

GROSS REFERENCES

FOR ACTION BY: : SUSPENSE DATE : CONCURRENCES  
(file symbol only) :

GSCPU

File : Initial : Date  
Symbol :

OFFICER TAKING ACTION (and initials)

Capt Robert L. Morton *R.L.M. CHW*

Policy : Non-Policy : Recommending :  
Approval :

(File Symbol)

(Action)

APPROVED

TO:

FOR:

*MC*

*100*

*YH*

*13  
1 Apr 47*

MEMORANDUM FOR REPORT

Col Gerald F. Lillard:

1. The 2nd Attached Combat Co, G-3-Headquarters, Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Bolo Bn Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, consisting of 106 members, has not been favorably considered. No members have previously been recognized.

2. This unit does not fulfill the requirements of the five basic points for recognition. See attached Team Leader's Report.

3. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit.

4. There are no members worthy of recognition and it is doubtful that any casualties occurred as a result of the activities with the unit.

*Robert L. Morton*  
Capt Robert L. Morton

*C. H. Wentzell*  
Concur: Major C. H. Wentzell  
Actg Chief, Unit Branch

DECLASSIFIED

Authority/NWP 883075

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 883078



Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Agent in Charge



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 883078

HEADQUARTERS  
PHILIPPINES-RYUKYUS COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

GSCPU 091 PI

1709

36  
APO 707

2 APR 1947

Mr. Macayag Dimpingun  
Maribo, Maguing, Lanao  
Mindanso, Philippines

Dear Mr. Dimpingun:

The Commanding General has directed that you be informed that the Second Attached Combat Company, G-S-Headquarters, Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Bolo Battalion Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, purporting to be a guerrilla organization under your nominal control, is not favorably considered for recognition as an element of the Philippine Army.

A set of general requirements for guerrilla recognition, established by General MacArthur during the liberation of the Philippines, has been used as a guide in considering the record of this unit. After careful investigation and full consideration of all substantiating records and testimony of witnesses having pertinent knowledge, recognition of this guerrilla unit is not deemed to be warranted because of reasons mentioned below:

- a. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence.
- b. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy.
- c. Activities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy.
- d. A definite organization was not established.
- e. Adequate records were not maintained (names, ranks, dates of enlistment or joining, dates of promotions, and necessary related information).
- f. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity and organization.
- g. Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in the field to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation and family obligations.

G-3 Come back Copy

1 Apr 47

RLM/ram

Tel U 330



DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND 883078

Your attention is invited to Presidential Executive Order No. 68, Commonwealth of the Philippines, copy of which is attached, for any necessary action in connection therewith.

Sincerely,

1 Incl  
Executive Order No. 68  
dtd 26 Sept 45

THOMAS J. BROWN  
CWO, USA  
ASST ADJ GEN

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Capt Robert L. Horton

Concur: Major C. H. Wentzell  
Actg Chief, Unit Branch

HEADQUARTERS  
PHILIPPINES-RYUKYU COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

24 April 47/tbh

GSCPU 091 PI /709

✓  
APO 707

2 APR 1947

Mr. Macaayag Dimupingun  
Maribo, Maguing, Lanao  
Mindanso, Philippines

Dear Mr. Dimupingun:

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- d. A definite organization was not established.
- e. Adequate records were not maintained (names, ranks, dates of enlistment or joining, dates of promotions, and necessary related information).
- f. Unit did not show satisfactory continuity of activity and organization.
- g. Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in the field to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation and family obligations.

*am*

1-True Copy Filed W/Unit File  
1-True Copy Filed W/NFC File  
G-S Hq  
1-True Copy Filed W/201 File (Macaayag Dimupingun)  
1-True Copy Filed W/Cor File (2nd Attached Combat Co,  
Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Bolo B Unit, USAFIP)  
1-True Copy Filed W/TLR

GSCPU Comeback Copy

1 Apr 47

RLM/rwm

Rel U 330



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 883078

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Sincerely,

1 Incl  
Executive Order No. 68  
dtd 26 Sept 45

THOMAS J. BROWN  
CWO, USA  
ASST ADJ GEN

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2. This unit does not fulfill the requirements of the five basic points for recognition. See attached Team Leader's Report.

3. No useful purpose will be accomplished by further investigation of this unit.

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Capt Robert L. Morton

Concur: Major C. H. Wentzell  
Actg Chief, Unit Branch



Report on the Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Dolo Battalion  
Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines

1. The following report concerns the overall command of the Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Dolo Battalion Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, consisting of approximately 128 different units. A partial list of the larger units are listed in paragraph 3 below. The Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Dolo Battalion Unit, (LMS, FDBU, USAFIP), is also known as the "Fighting Blade Weapons Division" and the "Fighting Blood Weapon Division". A physical investigation of the unit in the field was not made nor considered necessary or desirable, but the commanding officer and other persons having pertinent knowledge of the unit's activities were contacted either personally or by correspondence. The statements of those contacted, and a complete study of the records of the unit, are reflected in the findings.

2. A few of the subordinate units of the Fighting Blade Weapons Division have been previously and separately not favorably considered for recognition by this headquarters. It was considered at that time that these units were only independent "Dolo Units". When this overall command was studied, these units were included for reconsideration. This report will support the previous discussion of these subordinate units of the Fighting Blade Weapons Division, and at the same time take into consideration the overall command and other subordinate units of that command, now pending under request for recognition.

3. The following is a partial list of subordinate units comprising the Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Dolo Battalion Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines:

- First Coastal Regiment
- Third Coastal Regiment
- Fourth Coastal Regiment
- First Boloe Regiment
- Second Basak Regiment
- Third Basak Regiment
- First Unayan Regiment
- First Separate Regiment
- Western Lanao Troop Movement
- Upland Infantry Regiment
- Western Lanao Separate Special Bn
- Bolo Battalions
- Separate Battalions and Companies
- Special Battalions and Companies
- Attached Battalions and Companies
- Provisional Battalions



4. ALLEGED HISTORY:

a. Prior to the arrival of the Japanese invading Forces on Mindanao, Brigadier General Guy O. Fort, commanding the 81st Division, USAFFE, Lanao Military Sector, organized the "Bolo Battalion," for the purpose of aiding the 81st Division. The missions of the Bolo Battalion were as follows:

- (1) Guarding the beaches in order to give timely warning in case of enemy landings.
- (2) Acting as Labor Battalions when so desired.
- (3) Guarding bridges and roads.
- (4) Guarding ammunitions, supplies and other military installations.
- (5) Suppressing fifth column activities.

b. The "Lanao Military Sector" was divided into four units. Each unit was composed of several groups or companies, as many as there were municipalities or municipal districts in the unit. Each group or company was commanded by a Senior Leader, usually the Mayor of the municipality or municipal district, and two other leaders selected from the group or company. Each Bolo Battalion Unit was commanded by a Unit Commander; the four Bolo Battalion Units which comprised the "Lanao Military Sector" were commanded by Sector Commander, supposedly an officer of the USAFFE.

c. On 21 May 1942, six days prior to the surrender of the 81st Division, General Fort ordered Datu Busran Kalaw to take command of the entire Blade Weapons Forces (Fighting Bolo Battalion Units), which were then extended along the coast from Iligan to Cabuano Barracks and on the Lake-Shore of Lake Lanao. On 27 May 1942, the 81st Division, USAFFE, surrendered, and three days later Datu Busran Kalaw reorganized the Bolo Battalions. "To this organization, everybody was permitted to join-members of the former Bolo Battalions, ex-USAFFE, Civil Government employees" - Numerous companies, battalions and regiments were organized, until all the regions of Lanao, not occupied by the Japanese were covered. The organization was partly completed on 31 August 1942, and consisted of approximately ten (10) regiments, several separate, special provisional, combat, and attached battalions and companies, with a total strength of approximately 35,000 officers and men.

d. The activities of the unit consisted primarily in continuing civil and military government and the care and protection of civilians. A few claimed skirmishes with the Japanese are discussed in more detail in the findings of this report.



e. On or about December 1942, Lt Col Hodges, commanding officer of the 108th Division, 10th MD, began to organize the Moros into the Maranao Militia Forces, (MMF). Datu Busran Kalaw and approximately 8,000 members of the Bolo Battalion Units were inducted into this unit; and were subsequently recognized as the Maranao Militia Force (MMF) of the 108th Division, 10th Military District.

f. For further information relating to the alleged history of the Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Bolo Battalion Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, see attached unit files.

#### 5. FINDINGS:

a. The following persons were interviewed or questioned by letter and their statements are reflected in the findings:

Gen Calixto Duque . . . . .	D C/S, HPA, formally C/S 81st Div, USAFFE
Datu Busran Kalaw . . . . .	CO, LMS, FBUD, USAFIP
Col W. W. Fertig . . . . .	CO, 10th Military Dist
Edward M. Kuder . . . . .	An American educator in Lanao
Datu Mangoda . . . . .	G-2 of Bolo Battalion
Lt Maniaba Aguan . . . . .	Member of unit, later joined MMF, recognized with 10th MD
Datu Mangoda Maulana . . . . .	Member of unit, but does not know position
Mama Komeyat . . . . .	" " "
Datu Darangina Diampuan . . . . .	CO, Diamaa Islam Unit
Major F. M. Matas . . . . .	CO, Philippine Militia Forces, and later recog- nized with MMF
Federico Salamat . . . . .	" " " " " "
Major Gabal . . . . .	Ex O to G-4, HPA, formally A C/S-G-2, 81st Div, USAFFE
Antonio Pace . . . . .	Recognized Moro with 10th MD
Alfredo Quilban . . . . .	Member of Philippine Mili- tia Forces of Mindanao & Sulu

b. Records of service were not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence. The Lanao Military Sector, FBUD, USAFIP, and its subordinate units, as presented for recognition, was not in any sense a well-organized guerrilla unit. Prior to the surrender of the 81st Division, USAFFE, the Bolo Battalions were used by General Fort as "Bolo Units", "Farmer Battalions", and "Labor Battalions". According to the "Guerrilla Resistance Movements in the Philippines", a collection of monographs previously published by the Philippine Sub-Section, G-2, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, the Moros were under their own leaders, but had been paid by the USAFFE prior to the surrender. But even if they had not been paid, their activities would not constitute a claim



for guerrilla activities, but rather would be a claim for pay as labor battalions in aiding the 81st Division. Letter Order from General Fort to Datu Kalaw, ordering him to take command of the Blade Weapon Forces does not necessarily prove that the unit continued as a well-organized unit. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines (extract as Incl 1) and letter from Col. W. W. Fertig, (Incl 2) state that when the Japanese invading forces landed at Davao the Moro Force dissolved rapidly, and that the activities against the enemy as claimed by the Lanao Military Sector, after the surrender of the 81st Division were not the activities of the Blade Weapon Units, but a general and spontaneous uprising of the people. The records of the unit, such as General Orders, S-1 Reports, and S-2 Reports, consist primarily of promotion papers of the members of the unit. Promotions were made periodically. Each month most officers were promoted to one higher rank.

c. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy, for prior to 27 May 1942 the 81st Division, USAFFE, dominated the area and subsequent to Sept 1942 the Maranao Militia Forces of the 10th Military District, a recognized guerrilla organization of approximately 8,000 former members from the claimant Bolo Battalions, dominated the area. Resistance activities against the Japanese during the 3-months period between these dates consisted of an uprising of the people of Lanao, and not in guerrilla activity by the LMS, FEBU, USAFIP. The statements of guerrilla leaders, as discussed in paragraphs 5i, 5j, 5k, indicate that the Bolo Battalions was not maintained after the surrender of the 81st Division.

d. Activities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy. The "Guerrilla Resistance Movements of the Philippines", brings to the attention that the Moros were neither a valuable ally nor a dangerous enemy. The principal claim for recognition by the LMS, FEBU, USAFIP, is based upon two local battles with the Japanese in September and October 1942. The Diamaa Islam Unit, a bitter foe of Kalaw, under Datu Diampuan, also claims credit for these engagements, as indicated above and by incls. 2 and 3, written by individuals having personal knowledge. These battles can not be accepted as the activities of this or any other organized guerrilla unit. The Lanao Military Sector, FEBU, USAFIP, is therefore claiming activities which were executed by the initiative of a resentful and angered tribe, rather than by their units.

e. A definite organization was not established. Prior to 27 May 1942, Datu Busran Kalaw was an intelligence agent of the 81st Division, USAFFE, and during the latter months of the same year he became a member of the Maranao Militia Force. Officers and enlisted men of the Lanao Military Sector, FEBU, LMS, lived with their families and supported them by means of normal civilian pursuits throughout the occupation. Practically all of the battalion commanders and ranking officers on the roster of



this unit were mayors of the various towns or held other political positions during the Japanese occupation. The members of the unit who were interviewed, with the exception of the leaders, could not give their positions within the various units and most of them stated that there was very little organization within the unit.

f. Adequate records were not maintained. Monthly rosters, appointment and promotion papers, dated back as far as 1942, were submitted as records; but an examination of these papers showed that most of the monthly rosters were made at one time, using carbon papers and leaving the dates blank, so that the date could be placed in later. Furthermore the paper used did not show the wear and tear of paper that had been used since 1942.

g. Unit did not show satisfactorily continuity of activity and organization. Colonel W. W. Fertig, commanding the 10th MD, states that this unit did nothing to stop the Japanese (See Incl 2) advance and were more harmful than helpful to the USAFME. "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines", supports this statement of unsatisfactory continuity of activity and organization by declaring that the Moro forces dissolved rapidly after the Japanese landed in Davao. The unit could not show any conclusive supporting evidence which would sustain their claims of activity subsequent to the surrender of the 81st Division.

h. Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in the field to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation and family obligations. The members of the unit holding political positions, such as mayors, continued to remain in office during the Japanese occupation. The members of the unit who were common farmers and laborers continued their normal pursuits.

i. Attached hereto, as inclosure 2, is the first indorsement, dated 15 January 1947, from Colonel Wendell Fertig in answer to letter from this headquarters requesting information regarding the Fighting Blade Weapons Unit. Colonel Fertig, formerly with General Fort, later became commanding officer of the 10th Military District. In his indorsement Colonel Fertig emphasized that the Blade Weapons Unit (also known as the Lanao Military Sector, FBWU, USAFIP) did nothing to stop the Jap advance and contributed nothing to the resistance prior to the surrender. He further states that the period from the surrender to the organization of the Maranao Militia Forces on December 1942 was one of non-resistance, except for the resistance of a group of Moros under Manalao Mandalinao, whose name is not included as one of the leaders of the Lanao Military Sector, FBWU, USAFIP, whereas he is recognized as the regimental commander of the 127th Regiment, MMF, 10th MD. Colonel Fertig further states that the encounter between the Japanese and the Moros was occasioned by a general uprising of the people and not by the Blade Weapons Units. Col. Fertig recommends that the Blade Weapon Units and associated units in the province of Lanao be not recognized.



j. Attached herewith as inclosure 3, is a memo to Lt Col Shaftoe, former Chief of Guerrilla Affairs Branch, from Edward M. Kuder regarding the Bolo Battalions under Busran Kalaw. (It must be noted that the "Diana Islam" unit mentioned in his report is not a part of the Lanao Military Sector, FEBBU, USAFIP) Mr. Kuder was an American educator who had spent years educating the Moros before the war and who later became Director of Civil Affairs for Lanao under Colonel W. W. Fortig. This memo indicated that the Lanao Military Sector, FEBBU, USAFIP, is a racketeering organization, which had inducted practically all of its members into the unit during the years 1945 and 1946, and that the leaders have been collecting fees from the members inducted. Mr. Kuder has full knowledge of the activities of Lanao, during the occupation, and he recommends that this unit be refused recognition completely.

k. A letter "To Whom It May Concern", from General Calixto Duque formerly Chief of Staff, 81st Division, (USAFPE), and at present Deputy Chief of Staff, Army of the Philippines, was presented as supporting evidence of Kalaw's activities. On interviewing General Duque, he stated that he had been with the 81st Division until the surrender and was then prisoner of war in Mindanao until January 1943. He acknowledges the appointment of Datu Busran Kalaw as special agent of the G-2 Section 81st Division, but he did not know of any of Kalaw's activities after the surrender. He further stated that the Moros of Lanao were very destructive after the surrender of the 81st Division. He asserted that the Moros had ambushed some of the USAFFE members of the 81st Division while they were escaping to the hills. He also claimed that there was no organization of the Moro people and that they were a great hindrance to the people of Lanao, especially the Christians, for the Moros had attacked various Christian barrios, had raped and killed the inhabitants and had looted houses. General Duque had heard of the defeat of the Japanese at Tapanan, but he did not know how it was accomplished.

l. An affidavit from Major Dominador Garcia, formerly AC of S, G-3, 81st Infantry Division, USAFFE, was forwarded as evidence of the existence of the Bolo Battalions. When interviewed, Major Garcia stated that he knew nothing of the Activities of Kalaw, or the Bolo Battalion, after the surrender of the 81st Division.

m. Attached herewith as inclosure 4, is a confidential report from Operative Number one, Intelligence Section, MPC, PA, Lanao Province, Operative Number, Lt Manioba Aguan, a native of Lanao and former member of the Bolo Battalions, later became a member of the Maranao Militia Force. It is noted, that within the report, Lt Aguan brings out the fact that after the surrender of the 81st Division, many of the members of the Bolo Battalion became Collaborators, infamous looters, robbers, bandits, etc., while others continued their normal pursuits. He further states that the roster and orders submitted to this headquarters were antedated, and that the cadre of the Bolo Battalion are members of the already recognized Maranao Militia Forces.



n. Datu Darangina Diampuan, a non-recognized guerrilla leader, who had operated in Lanao, claims that Datu Kalaw had never had an organized unit after the surrender of the 81st Division. He further stated that Kalaw is using the Bolo Battalion as a money-making proposition, in that, he is charging the members for their membership. Datu Darangina Diampuan also claims that the Moros of the former Bolo Battalion under Kalaw were more destructive during the Japanese occupation than they were constructive.

o. It should be emphasized that the Moros of Lanao were organized into the Maranao Militia Force, with a strength of approximately 6,000 members. The Maranao Militia Force was recognized with the 10th Military District as part of the 108th Division. The dates of recognition of the Maranao Militia Force were revised back to 16 September 1942. This recognition and revision constitutes adequate and just recognition of military services the Moros of Lanao to the war effort.

p. No useful purpose will be served by any further investigation of this unit.

q. There are no individual members worthy of recognition with the exception of those already recognized with the Maranao Militia Force. Although some casualties are claimed in the rosters, it is assumed that these casualties occurred in the general uprising of the people, and not as members of an organized unit. These casualties or their heirs may continue to submit individual request for casualty recognition.

6. POLITICAL ASPECTS: Most of the leading figures in the submitted rosters are political aspirants, indicating that the unit may be used to support these politicians in their attempts to gain office.

7. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Lanao Military Sector, Fighting Bolo Battalion Unit, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, otherwise known as the Fighting Blade Weapons Division, be not favorably considered for recognition.

*Robert L. Morton*

ROBERT L. MORTON  
Captain, Ord

See incls filed w/ Team Leader's  
Report in GAD.



Extract of Guerrilla Resistance Movements in the Philippines

The Moros and the Maranao Militia Force: The Moro problems on Mindanao have long been a source of discontent and unrest. The Moros are a distinct Mohammedan group and are found throughout the Sulus, along the southern coast of Zamboanga, the southern half of Lanao Province and across Cotabato to the Davao Gulf. The Maranao (Lanao) Moros are perhaps the bravest, proudest and the most intelligent of the Philippine Moro groups: Maranao (Lanao), Maguindanao (Cotabato) and the Tao-Sugs and Samals (Zamboanga and Sulu). Intelligence, courage and pride, however, do not make the Lanao Moro either a valuable ally or a dangerous enemy. His intelligence is more nearly sly cunning, going hand in hand with treachery. The Moro has little respect for the Christian Filipino and may always be antagonistic towards him.

Moro villages are small, usually built up around a farming community, and the inhabitants are usually related to each other. While each community is loyal to its own leader, the leaders of these inter-related communities form as association and have a group leader, or Datu, to whom all community leaders are loyal. For the past forty years Moros have been under the control of the Philippine Constabulary, but most of the Moros remember that they were once the absolute rulers of their areas and were free to rob and murder groups less powerful than themselves. With any relaxing of police authority many of them soon return to their ancient customs of robbery and murder, with loyalty only to their immediate leaders.

To prevent bloodshed between Moros and Christians, no Moros were allowed to live on the north coast of Lanao and none lived in Bukidnon. During the chaos following the surrender, Moros came down the north slopes of the Lanao hills and began molesting the Christians. MORGAN's retaliatory measures were so violent, however, that the feelings of the Moros were aroused more than ever, and it has been only with considerable care that the support and neutrality of the Moros was maintained. In the Dinas vicinity of southern Zamboanga no Christian dare set foot now as a result.

In January 1942, when it became evident that it would be difficult if not impossible to stem the tide of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Gen. FORT tried to bolster the Mindanao Force by organizing and placing thousands of Moros in holding defensive positions along key highways in the southern part of Mindanao. He organized the Moro Bolo Battalion, active young Moros armed with knives. The Moros were under their own leaders but were paid by USAFFE. They had little time for training and when the Japanese landed in Davao, the Moro force dissolved rapidly. Many prominent Moros were attached to this group and later became active in guerrilla affairs in Lanao and Cotabato.

Lt. Col. HEDGES began to organize the Moros in December 1942 - January 1943. He collected most of the former members of the Bolo Battalion and formed the Maranao Militia Force. The early leaders of the Moros in guerrilla activities were: MINDALANO, former member of the Bolo Battalion, a hot tempered young Moro; Busran KALAW of Momungan; Datu LAGUINDAB of Ganassi; Joseph SANGUILLA of Mumay and Medalum; and Datu BUNTALIS of Masiu.



By late 1942 the Moros had collected a fairly large number of weapons. After the surrender they ransacked the battlefields and waylaid civilians and former USAFFE soldiers for weapons. The threat to the guerrilla organization was real. The efforts of Busran KALAW, MINDALANO, the Sultan of Ganassi and many others to bring the Moros into line is a monumental tribute to their respect for the American people. They were supported in their efforts by very small allotments of arms and supplies from the guerrilla headquarters. The one time location of the District Headquarters in Lanao and the presence of guerrilla leaders (such as Lt. Col. HEDGEC and Mr. KUDER) who knew the Moros well, were fortunate in this connection.

For political reasons the Maranao Militia Force is maintained as a separate part of the 100th Division, and is probably the best armed single group of guerrillas on Mindanao. The present organization and strength of this force is as follows:

124th Regt, MMF, Hq Rupagon, Lanao	Off	EM
CO: Capt. Macaurog ARUMPAC	36	1,538
126th Regt, MMF		
CO: Maj. Busran KALAW	118	1,124
127th Regt, MMF, now sieging Malabang		
CO: Capt. Manalao MINDALANO	73	788
128th Regt, MMF, now sieging Malabang		
CO: Maj. Anonngo BAGUINDAALI	100	951
129th Regt, MMF, Hq Taraka, Lanao	78	1,202
1st Prov. Regt.	63	928
2nd Prov. Regt.	53	533
2nd, 4th, 6th 8th Separate Battalions	71	1,470
5 Separate Companies	5	307
Total	597	8,841

Lt. Naguib GUANDY, Chinese-Moro mestizo and pre-war mayor of Malabang, has been responsible for organizing Moro resistance south of Malabang on the Lanao coast. He has protected the Christians and has kept on good terms with the Japanese to obtain supplies. KALAW is a native of Momungan, Lanao, was mayor of Momungan at outbreak of the war and is ex-provincial treasurer of Lanao. He is an associate of Capt. MORGAN, and actively resisted the Japanese since 1942. MINDALANO is an ex-school inspector, clever and courageous, very hot tempered. He was the first to fight the Japanese after the USAFFE surrender. ARUMPAC was mayor of Lumbatan; clever, a little politico, a good manager and belongs to the Masonic order. BAGUINDAALI is popular as one of the first Moro guerrilla leaders.

Copy reproduced - 15 Apr 47

*Protacio Cabiao*  
 PROTACIO CABIAO  
 1st Lt., Inf., AUS  
 Chief, Records Section



1st Ind.

15 January 47

SUBJECT: "Blade Weapons Division"

TO : The Commanding General, AEWESPAC, APO 707. From Co. Wendell W. Fertig, Det Pat Fitzsimons Gen Hospital, Denver 8, Colorado.

1. Conditions have not changed since I wrote my letter of 28 Mar 46, this same general subject, and I will reiterate the recommendation contained in that letter (Incl 3). Therefore in my opinion this group is not entitled to recognition for any activities following the organization of the 10th Military District on 16 Sept 42. All men who assisted my unit after that date have been included in regular unit rosters and duly recognized. Thus the Blade Weapon units are entitled to no consideration except for services rendered between the date of their organization (about Jan 42) and the date of 16 Sept 42.

2. That period comprises two general but diverse phases. The first covers the passive and active phase of the Mindanao campaign prior to the surrender of General Fort and his forces on 29 May 42. During the invasion period - April 30 - 4 May 42 - while I was actually with General Fort, he placed great confidence in the help to be gained from the Blade Weapon units which he had organized. This help was not forthcoming. THEY DID NOTHING TO STOP THE JAP ADVANCE. When the debacle followed after 4 May 42, the Moros engaged in wide scale looting. In July 42, Lt Col Charles Smith, CE (then a civilian employee of the USED) stated that General Fort was forced to surrender since his reserve food stores and ammunition had been looted by the Lanao Moros. From evidence, which I believe was conclusive, the Blade Weapon units contributed nothing to the resistance cause during this first phase.

3. The second phase of inertia that extended from 29 May 42 until 16 Sept 42, was one of quietness except for the continued resistance of Manalao Mandalinao (Now Representative from Lanao in the Philippine Legislature) and his group in conjunction with that of Datu Aguam. The Japs failed to win this group. In August, a company of Japanese were wiped out on the east shore of Lake Lanao, but this was done by a general uprising of the people and not by the Blade Weapon units.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION- A careful study of this problem was made during the occupation period, and I found little evidence that the Blade Weapon units contributed to the fostering of the resistance movement. It is therefore recommended that this and associated units in the province of Lanao be not recognized.

Wendell W Fertig  
Colonel CE

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*Protacio Cabiao*  
PROTACIO CABIAO  
1st Lt Inf., AUS  
Chief, Records Section

(Incl 2)



Manila  
9 June 1946

MEMO for Lt. Col Shaftoe, Chief, Guerrilla Affairs Division,  
AFWESPAC, on Lanao Guerrillas.

#### THE DIAMA ISLAM

This is an organization which deserves considerable credit for providing the big impetus that turned most of the Lanao Moros against the Japs.

I was in Lanao, with the Moros and the guerrilla movement from the moment the Japs invaded Lanao, April 29-30, 1942 up to Sept 29, 1943. I was never in Japs hands, but had to leave Lanao for Australia by submarine on Sept 29, 1943, due to illness.

Hence, although I did not see the fights the Diama Islam put up, in fact was about 50 kilometers away, still I had eye-witness reports of it within two days afterward, and observed how the whole province rang with the exploit of Sept 12, 1942, and how the Moros were stirred up and inspired by it.

It is true there had been encounters and ambushes prior to this, but this was the first big pitched battle. The speed with which the Japs were overwhelmed and wiped out, all but one man, made an enormous impression on everyone including the Japs. Our intelligence at that time indicated that they asked for two divisions for Mindanao, one for Lanao alone and the other for the rest of the island. I do not think the Jap force was so large as the Diama leaders claimed, for I checked the number of dead several times with people who counted the corpses at the time. The figure I get most often from them was 129 Japs, and some Filipinos, used as cargadors by the Japs, who were caught in the circle of fire. The Moros did not bother to count them.

After this disaster the Japs bombed the whole east side of the Lake, where the fight occurred (Tamparan) for nearly a month, using from 3 to 11 planes daily, other tried again in mid-October 1942. This time they came with around 500-600 troops, in trucks, using the road around the north end of the lake.

They were again attacked by the Diama warriors and this time did not try to stand their ground, but fled to a wooded hill, losing some of their trucks in the process. At the hill, they were able to rally and hold off through attackers until the latter's ammunition ran low, and until reinforcements came to enable them to retreat. The Moros lost about 20 men in this fight and claimed heavy losses for the Japs, but as the Japs carried them dead and wounded away, we had to wait for our intelligence in Dansalan (Jap main garrison) to



report. This report put the Jap total casualties at under a hundred.

But the Japs never came back, and never again patrolled in the interior of Lanao, although they maintained their garrison at Dansalan by virtue of the highway to Iligan, and at Garassi by means of the Lake, from Dansalan.

Thus, within five months after Corregidor, the interior country of Lanao was freed of the Japs and remained free. This was a remarkable achievement and is due largely to the Diama Islam.

Since the Japs never returned they had no more fighting to do, but did guard the lake to prevent supplies from reaching the Japs.

As the Diama Islam was self-supporting in the way of food, guns and ammunition, many of its members found economic pressure too strong hence joined the Marenao Militia Force under Col. Fertig, some months later, for the sake of better pay and supply.

Pride, perhaps misplaced, kept the others from joining and held them to something of a home guard organization.

Yet, it must not be forgotten that they battled and best the Japs before Fertig even started, and it must also be realized that had it not been for the beatings and fight they gave the Japs, Fertig's initially puny organization would in all likelihood have been crushed.

The Diama Islam rendered a real service.

Their leader claims 4,599 men on his roll. Personally, I think this is greatly exaggerated. I don't believe they could possibly have more than 2000 men. This jibes well with the population figures for that area, but, knowing as I do how factional the Moros are among themselves, I would examine even that figure with caution.

I believe the Diama Islam is entitled to some recognition after careful investigation.

The Bolo Battalion, under Busram Kalaw

I understand this outfit claims 40,000 members. If such is their claim it is the wildest fabrication. The "seat" of this organization was in the area along the Dansalan Iligan road. If it had 40,000 members why could it never close that road, nor take the Jap outpost of 20 men guarding the Pantas bridge, when between 1000 and 2000 Diama Islam could beat the Japs so badly in the Diama's home territory?



Busran Kalaw, the Bolo Battalion leader, may claim credit for the Diama Islam's exploit at Tamparan. It may be true that he was there, but his back was to the Japs, and it was in trying to overtake him that the Japs ran into the Diama.

Busran never got closer than 5 kms to the Japs, and I never saw him with as many as 200 men, although I saw him a dozen of times during the guerrilla times.

There was a real Bolo Battalion organized by General Fort before the Japs came, April 29-30, 1942, but it never exceeded 5,000 men and virtually all of these joined the MMF under Fertig.

After Fort's surrender, to give him credit, Busran Kalaw tried to stir up resistance against the Japs, but he had a following only in his own area, Baluy, the thinnest populated area of Lanao. He could not possibly have had one thousand men.

It was not until late 1945 and now in 1946 that so many members were "enlisted" in their outfit. It has much racketeering in it, with contributions collected from the members to pay for preparing rosters, giving birthday or baptismal presents to its leaders and their children, sale of "commissions" etc. As it stands now it is 99% fake. One of its officers a "major" or "Lt. Col." Buleg Mangobara, was actually a dog of the Japanese and guided their patrols.

I would turn this outfit down, cold and completely.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Edward M. Kuder  
Actg. Div. Supt, of Schools for Lanao  
ex-Director of Civil Affairs for Lanao under  
Col W. W. Fertig

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*Protacio Cabiao*  
PROTACIO CABIAO  
1st Lt Inf., AUS  
Chief, Records Section



HEADQUARTERS  
 LANA O PROVINCE  
 MILITARY POLICE COMMAND PA  
 Intelligence Section

MA/33a-

APO 159  
 12 Apr 46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Bolo Battalion, History of (Lanao Province)


TO : FPM, Lanao Prov, MFC, PA - APO 159

Fairly reliable if not very accurate story of the history of the Moro Bolo Battalion organization in Lanao, is here, submitted by this section not for jealousy nor selfishness, neither for aggrandizement, but as intelligence section of the Agency of the government, it will in some how dissipate any shadow of doubt on the part of the Philippine Govt much the United States. This story will not only help clear the doubts of AFWESPAC, but will in one way guide AFWESPAC to recompense justly the very patriots.

Some where in the later part of December 1941, letters from the Provincial Governor were sent to all Municipal and Municipal District Mayors urging each Mayor to organize in their own districts, Volunteer Guards. To give more inspiration and incentives to accomplish result to the maximum the order was propogandized thru out Lanao, that this Volunteer Guards is enunciated by the most Filipino beloved Late President Manuel L. Quezon. The Volunteer Guard was very successful.

Then and afterward some where in the earlier part of February 1942, if not January 1942, Brig Gen Guy O Fort, CO of the 81st Division (USAFFE) stationed in Lanao Province authorized the organization of the Bolo Battalion. He himself (Gen Fort) being a good and sincere friend to the Maranaws for many years went around the Moro villages stressing on the importance of Loyalty to the gov't one owes an allegiance. He himself (Gen Fort) witnessed and even sworn before the Koran (Sacred Mohammedan Bible) with many leading Datus that they being members of the Bolo Battalion will, in all means resist the enemy, the Japanese, and even sworn that they (Datus) will never surrender to the Japanese if in case the Japanese might succeed vanquishing the USAFFE. Again Mayor (District Mayors) were made immediate leaders of their respective districts. Many Mayors and Datus were given shot guns and even spring-field rifles Cal 30 ML to give them more interest in leading their own people. In the months of March and April, 1942, Mayors especially of Watu, Tugaya, Bacolod, Madalim, M-Gamba, Ganassi, Pualas, Tatarikan, and Pinidayan were each given seven days to guard at Barorao beach, at Malabang, Lanao to watch and report immediately any sign of Japanese ships seen on the Lilliana Bay. This was by rotation. Even teachers headed by their District supervisor were one time volunteered to guard at Barorao.

So far, every Mayor, was allowed fifty (50) companions, They were being transported there by Army Trucks purposely designated for use of the Bolo Battalion. Officers in the USAFFE assigned by Gen Fort to inspect and guide the Moro Bolo Battalion were Major Suarez now Colonel, he is somewhere in Sulu, 1st Lieut. Mamarinta Lao, now Capt, Commanding the 64th MP Co, Lanao Prov, MFC, PA, 3d Lt Mohamad Ali Dimapore now 1st Lieut, Commanding the 69th MP Co, Lanao Prov, MFC, PA, 3d Lt Santos Imperial, now in the 5th Repl Bn and 3d Lt Mantoyan Bayolan; There officers perhaps do not know even the number of the Bolo Battalion that time they were heading the organization. Major Gabal that time was the one approving certificate of an individual recommended by the District Mayor to be a member of the Bolo Battalion.





History of Bolo Bn, Cont'd

Now figuring and comparatively speaking there are 33 Municipal Districts in the province of Lanao and not all actively organized the memberships for the Bolo Battalion. Let us take for granted that the 33 municipal districts did actively in the organization of the Bolo Battalion and again let us not count that every district Mayor had their fifty memberships, let us even make it 100 for each Mayor or let us put it for 200 or 300 which is really not the truth, then of the 33 Mayors there will be let us say 300 for each, thus there were 9,900 members. Now granting that there were 9,900 Bolo Battalion, but during the Japanese invasion between Malebang and Genassi there were roughly 60 Moro Bolo Battalion members present. Mayor Suarez had a personal knowledge of this number for he was with them that night of May, 1st 1942.

Again when the USAFFE in Lanao surrendered to the Japanese on the later part of May 1942 of this rough estimate of 9,900 Bolo Battalion some of them continued to resist the enemy called loyal and patriots afraid of the Koraan, some went to the Japanese as Collaborators, some of them became famous looters, robbers, Army murderers, bandits, kidnapers of Christians and Subanon on the eastern part of Zamboanga, some went as active traffickers of white slavery and while few stayed further Japanese garrisons and devoted on farming. This was the truth of where the Bolo Battalion went and what each did.

Those few who went to the mountains continued resisted the enemy did something very splendid in stirring the minds of the Lanao Moro Public to mention some of them, there were Datu Busran of Balo-i, Datu Manalao Mindalanso of Uye-an, and Lumbetan, Sultan sa Genassi the late Aguan Dpatuan, the late Datu Leguindab all Genassi, Datu Anango Bagindali or Ramain, Datu Beod of Pagulogan, Datu Malomit Umpe of Kepetegan and some few Detus of Tamparan Districts. These Detus mentioned above really did something in arousing the people of Lanao. This was more than 3 months before the organization of the 10th MD under Col Fertig was organized and more than 6 months before the organization of the 108th Division under Col Hedges. It is further stated that at Tamparan Districts after the Tamparan incident of September 12, 1942 when Japanese patrol was wiped out entirely there was one group there called Digma Islam who really fought the Japanese and until now they are intact nor they were recognized as guerrillas.

Above Detus mentioned after the 108th Division was organized units, called the Bolo Battalion were inducted into the USFIP and there was a great joy for they were all happy being told by Col Hedges that they become a part of the United States Army and whatever privileges given or due to American soldiers and officers, they are also entitled. This goes to say that the Loyal Bolo Battalion that remained in the mountains became the nucleus of the Lanao Guerrilleros. Almost 95% of the Bolo Battalion became the Lanao Guerrilleros under the 108th Division who were long time processed by the 8th Army. The only outfit that did not submit for processing because they were not recognized was the Digma Islam.

Last May 1945, Mayor Navarro, Inspector General of the 10th MD had a complete and correct list of the Maranao Guerrilleros. He got more than 8,000 men both officers and EM. This was the whole MMF (Maranao Militia Force) already recognized by the 8th Army since 17 April 45. This story is speaking of the real comparison and a truth that of the more than 8,000 Maranaos recognized guerrilleros which then 95% or 90% of them were the members of the Bolo Battalion could be considered Bolo Bn members from February 1942 up to the time they were inducted to the USFIP by the 108th Division. Now make it 9000 and estimate the Digma Islam make them 3,000 the highest estimate that will only bring 12,000. Now for the Christian Guerrilleros of Lanao make them 4,000 or more and Lanao will have about 17,000.



The Christian Guerrilleros genuined at that organized by Morgan are not counted here.

To give more support for this story Mr. Edward M. Kuder the only American with the Marenews in the mountains in 1942 can also be asked.

However, for the present submitted strength of Bolo Battalion to the AFWESPAC there were those names found in the defunct 108th Division for they were either officers or EM in that outfit.

OPERATIVE

#1

P. S.


Anti dated rosters and orders, framed up reports and statements and entering names in the 1945 submitted Bolo En, Rosters are mostly in the rosters of the MMF now in the files of the defunct 108th Division, 10th MD, Great Anomally.

Note Operative #1 is:

Lt Manioba Aguem  
Dept of Interior  
City Hall, Manila, P.I.

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*Francisco C. Cabiao*  
FRANCISCO CABIAO  
1st Lt. Inf. AUS  
Chief, Records Section



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